A notion of sufficient input

In this paper, we study a notion of sufficient input, i.e. input that allows to produce at least one unit of output when the other inputs are fixed at any positive level. We show that such an input allows to produce any positive amount of production. The main property of sufficient inputs is as follows. A input is sufficient if and only if the unit cost goes to zero when its price goes to zero.

"On the differentiability of the benefit function": correction and addendum

The proposition 1 of our paper "On the differentiability of the benefit function" (Economics Bulletin, March, 24) is incorrect under the assumption 1. We provide two alternative versions of this assumption under which the statement of proposition 1 holds true.Benefit function

A theory of the optimal amount of public ownership of land

A major issue in reforming previously planned economies is the creation of assets markets. In this paper, it is argued that the mere characteristics of the assets to be privatized matter. Indeed, private ownership of land. It is the purpose of this paper to provide a theory of such rate. We make use of a two-sectors overlapping generations model economy with land and capital. We find a version of the second welfare theorem : the command optimum can be decentralized using one and only one instrument, i.e. the rate of land publicly held. We call such a rate the optimal rate of public ownership of land.

Allais's Trading Process And The Dynamic Evolution of an OLG Markets Economy

We study a trading process for a pure exchange economy with overlapping generations. This process is based on the maximization, at each stage, of a collective benefit (or surplus). We show that this process converges to a Pareto-optimal allocation. This extends the second fundamental convergence theorem of Allais [1967] to a pure exchange economy with overlapping generations

Complementarity and Substitutability: A Dual Approach Based on Luenberger's Benefit Function

Working paperThis paper presents another definition of substitutes and complements. It follows a dual approach using the Luenberger's benefit function. The benefit function measures the amount of a reference bundle that an individual would be willing to give up to move from a given utility level to any bundle. Therefore the benefit function associates to any bundle of goods another bundle that lies on a given indifference curve. This enables one to derive an inverse demand function which is defined as the support price of this associated bundle. The classification of goods between complements and substitutes is then obtained by the comparative static properties of the support price. We present some examples which show that the proposed classification is different from the one obtained with another dual approach based on Deaton's distance function

Characterization of Stochastic Dominance for Discrete Random Variable

Working paperAvailable characterizations of the various notions of stochastic dominance concern continuous random variables. Yet, discrete random variables are often used either in pedagogical presentations of stochastic dominance or in experimental tests of this notion. This note provides complete characterizations of the various notions of stochastic dominance for discrete random variables

Les effets d’un risque démographique sur l’épargne.

Cet article étudie les effets sur l'épargne d'une incertitude sur le taux de croissance de la population dans un modèle à générations imbriquées. Nous montrons que les hypothèses nécessaires à la formation d'une épargne individuelle de précaution ne suffisent pas dans un cadre d'équilibre général. Le motif de précaution ne permet plus à lui seul ainsi de déterminer l'influence d'un accroissement du risque sur l'épargne d'équilibre.

French legal origins: A Tocquevilian view

We provide an alternative explanation of French legal centralization. To do this we develop a rational choice model of the legal architecture around 1789 and the French Revolution. Following Tocqueville we propose to analyze the French movement towards legal centralization as the result of an increase in the aversion to inequality before the law. We show that legal centralization can be preferred to the "Ancien Régime" situation or intermediate legal decentralization if the aversion to legal differences is sufficiently strong. In addition, we show that when the legal system is centralized it is always optimal to allow some degree of judicial discretion. This result is consistent with the historical evidence that the Napoleonic codification, i.e., the culmination of French legal centralization, was associated with a higher degree of judicial discretion than at the beginning of the Revolution. This view contrasts with the interpretation of the Napoleonic codification as a means of transforming judges into automata

Convergence of Legal Rules: Comparing Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Processes

AbstractLegal scholars distinguish two modes of international legal cooperation: minimum legal harmonization and full harmonization (</jats:p